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ABSTRACT
Function Call Graph Score for Malware Detection
by Deebiga Rajeswaran
Metamorphic malware changes its internal structure with each infection, while
maintaining its core functionality. Detecting such malware is a challenging research
problem. Function call graph analysis has previously shown promise in detecting such
malware. In this research, we analyze the robustness of a function call graph score
with respect to various code morphing strategies. We also consider modifications of
the score that make it more robust in the face of such morphing.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Today, computer systems are a basic necessity and malware has become a com-
mon problem faced by users of such systems. Cryptolocker [7] is a well-known example
of a class of malware known as ransomware [5]. As another example, it is claimed
that the Carberp banking trojan [7] looted approximately $250 million from banks
and financial institutions. When the hacker who created Carberp was arrested, the
source code was leaked and the code served as a resource for other aspiring hackers.
With the increase in the number of networked devices, there has been a rapid
growth in the malware population, which has led to an arms race between anti-
virus developers and malware writers [2, 18]. Anti-virus vendors have to be equally
competitive and try to stay one step ahead of the malware developer. McAfee labs
claim that some of their predictions for 2015 like the master boot record getting wiped,
rapid growth in malvertising like the came true within a span of two months [16].
The most common malware detection method is signature based detection [6]. In
this method, malware is matched with a database of known patterns. To evade sig-
nature detections, malware writers may obfuscate their code. Metamorphic malware
morphs its code structure at each infection, without changing its essential function-
ality [13, 21]. A variety of code obfuscation techniques have been used to generate
metamorphic code. Metamorphic detection is a challenging research problem. Among
the techniques previously analyzed for metamorphicdetection [13, 9], function call
graph analysis has been among the most successful [6, 17, 21].
The function call graph in [6, 17] is constructed by forming a graph with vertices
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representing subroutines and edges corresponding to control flow between the func-
tions. This score is based on these graphs, where we distinguish between external
functions and internal functions, and the score also uses opcode statistics and cosine
similarity.
In this research, we first implement the function call graph score as described
in [17, 21]. We then score several challenging malware families and we analyze the
effect of various code obfuscations [14, 15, 28] on the score. The goal is to determine
an effective and practical means of defeating this function call graph score. Based
on these results, we then consider ways to construct an improved function call graph
score.
This paper is structured as the follows. Chapter 2 provides details on types of
malware and malware detection techniques. Chapter 3 outlines the construction of
the function call graph and the similarity score based on these graphs. Chapter 4
covers code obfuscation techniques and the impact of such techniques on function
call graph analysis. In Chapter 5, we present experimental results for related to our
function call graph analysis. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the paper, and we also
discuss future work.
2
CHAPTER 2
Types of malware and Detection Techniques
The term "malware" means a malicious software [2] that causes undesired out-
come and effects in the system either without user’s command or misusing the user’s
command indirectly. It comprises of different types like virus, worm, trojan horse,
backdoor bot, spam, spyware, adware and ransomware [11]. In this chapter, we will
look into different types of malware based on action and concealment strategy and
malware detection techniques.
2.1 Types of malware
The malwares can be broadly classified based on their infection strategy as:
Viruses, Worms and Trojans
Virus is a self-replicating malware which attaches itself to other programs and
manifests its existence. On being triggered by a specific event or file execution, the
virus infects the target and conceals itself. Viruses are parasitic by nature and hence
reside in boot sector, executables or in data files.
Worms are spread through networks and generally aim at attacking the band-
width of the system. Unlike viruses, worms can execute standalone without depend-
ing on a host. The worms can be further sub-classified into Email worms, Instant
Messaging worms, Internet worms, IRC worms, File-sharing network worms.
Trojan horse deceives the user by representing itself as a useful application
but executes malicious code and harms the system. They can infect the system
through remote access, data destruction, down loader, server Trojan, anti-virus
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software dialog box or as a Denial of Service(DoS) attack. Trojan.Zbot [23] and
Trojan.ZeroAccess [24] used in our experiments are examples of Trojan virus.
Backdoor: Backdoor [2] is another notable malware that bypasses authentica-
tion, obtains remote access to the infected system and uses stealth techniques to lock
the resources of the system. It does not execute standalone but waits for orders from
the remote system. Harebot.M [8] is an example of the backdoor and has been used
in our research.
Few other notable types of malware are:
Bots: The bot is a malware that is vulnerable and lets the attacker or botmaster
to control it [19]. Once infected, the bot operates and obeys commands issued by the
botmaster without the system owner’s knowledge.
Spam: Spam are not malware by themselves but a medium for spreading mal-
ware files. Bulk messages are sent through the electronic messaging system with
malware attachments to random users.
Spyware: Spyware mainly aim at spying on the host system and stealing data
like user keystrokes.
Adware: Adware are the annoying pop up ads that we encounter. They display
ads without any user input or misleads a genuine user interaction.
Ransomware: Ransomware has been the worst form of malware [11]. It en-
crypts data in infected system or alters its access privileges and demands ransom
from the user to retrieve data. It not just fools people into paying ransom to save
data but most are not even ethical enough to provide data in return to the ransom [11].
In recent times, viruses are designed by malware writers such that they are
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undetected by the traditional signature based detection used by most of the anti-
virus softwares. With respect to the strategies used to conceal the signature of the
virus, they are classified into encrypted virus, oligomorphic virus, polymorphic virus
and metamorphic virus [22, 26].
2.1.1 Encrypted virus
In an encrypted virus, the malicious part of the code is encrypted by performing
a simple XOR operation with a key or a constant. The encryption is kept simple as
complicating it will affect the performance efficiency of the virus. Though not detected
initially [22], once a malware is identified, the decryption code in the malware is not
encrypted and hence it can be used as a signature and easily detected.
2.1.2 Oligomorphic virus
Oligomorphic virus is a slightly sophisticated version of the encrypted virus. The
only difference is that there are several copies of the decryption code that are used
at random. But again as discussed in encrypted virus, it will not take long for the
anti-virus software to add all the copies of decryptor code to the signature database.
2.1.3 Polymorphic virus
Polymorphic virus is a form of encrypted virus that posed a serious threat to
malware detection techniques [22]. The malware is encapsulated in a layer of encryp-
tion, the decryption code is programmed in such a way that it changes its form and
hence makes it difficult for the signature detection method. On every infection, the
decryption code restructures itself to evade signature check. These viruses can be
detected by executing the virus in an emulator where the decryption code decrypts
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and the actual malware code is exposed which can be checked for a signature match.
2.1.4 Metamorphic virus
Metamorphic virus are more advanced than the previous attempts by malware
writers. They are a challenging problem for the virus scanners [22, 26]. As the name
suggests, the virus changes the form of the whole code. The metamorphic virus
has a mutation engine which uses several obfuscation techniques [15] to tamper the
signature with no damage to the actual functionality of the malware. [22, 26] The code
has no encryption but the whole structure and pattern of the malware is modified
and hence detection by signature is almost impossible. The mutation engine may
be carried along by the virus or standalone generating multiple copies of the same
malware. The former may have limitations in the amount of metamorphism that can
be achieved as the mutation engine has to morph itself to stay undetected in signature
detection, but the latter is hard to be detected by signature detection.
2.2 Malware detection techniques
The malware detection techniques can be broadly classified as signature based,
heuristics based and statistics based of the malware.
2.2.1 Signature based detection
The signature based detection is the simplest and most effective detection means
for scanning known malwares. After a malware is identified, a unique string of the
malware is labeled as the signature of the malware and stored in the database of iden-
tified malwares by the anti-virus softwares. After the initial identification phase, when
the system is scanned the bytecodes of the files are compared with the signatures in
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the database. When any of the file matches the signature, it is considered as a mal-
ware and notified to the user. [26] The only limitation in the signature based detection
is that it fails to identify new malwares and advanced malwares like polymorphic or
metamorphic malwares.
2.2.2 Heuristics based detection
The heuristics based detection has a more practical approach towards detecting
malware. The executable is tested in a simulated environment [22] which strips out a
layer of obfuscation. The actual execution of the code in a safe environment exposes
the true intent of the file. Any suspicious file can be isolated from the rest of the files
and prevent the spread of the malware. This method effectively identifies new viruses
whose signature may not be in the database of the anti-virus software.
2.2.3 Statistics based detection
Statistics based detection is a detection technique in which in recent times more
research are done and there has been promising advancements. Machine learning has
been used to classify malware from benign files on many aspects as API calls, opcode
sequences, function calls, value set analysis etc. Hidden Markov Model (HMM) has
been a very effect means of static analysis that classifies malware but since it does not
store the position information of the hidden states it may not classify metamorphic
malware that effectively. But the Profile Hidden Markov Model (PHMM) solves the
limitation and has been found successful in classifying the metamorphic malwares [25].
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CHAPTER 3
Function call graph implementation
We will be discussing about the previous work done in functionality based analy-
sis of viruses, the construction of the function call graph and the similarity detection
between the malwares in this chapter.
3.1 Previous work
The detection of metamorphic malware by searching for a unique string is almost
impossible [13]. The code obfuscation layer has to be removed as part of the detection
and the score must be based only on the functional part of the malware or the behavior
of the malware.
Christodorescu and Jha [4] were the first to implement a static analysis based
on a control flow graph to eliminate code obfuscation techniques. Since then, there
has been many researches in the detection of metamorphic malware based on static
analysis like external functions [29] and cosine similarity between the functions [10].
Ming et al. [17] explains a similarity metric based on the function calls in the malware
and Shang et al. [21] details the time and space complexities involved in control flow
graphs and proposes a function call graph based detection method.
Shahid and Ibrahim [1] have proposed an annotated control flow graph in which
the instructions are grouped into 21 patterns and they have also parallelized the
process to boost the performance of the detection technique. Prasad [6] has proposed
a function call graph analysis in which a graph coloring technique is used to eliminate
several other obfuscation layers.
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3.2 Construction of the function call graph
This section details the pre-processing involved before constructing the function
call graph and construction.
3.2.1 Defining function boundaries
The executables are disassembled using IDA Pro disassembler. The functions in
the malware can be classified as local functions and external functions. The start of
the local functions are of format sub_xxxxxx proc near and ends with sub_xxxxxx
endp. The external functions comprises of the system functions and the library rou-
tines. The local functions are labeled differently in each malware but the external
functions are consistently named the same across all malwares. Our detection tech-
nique only considers the functions or sub-routines and the instruction sequences that
they execute. This defeats code transposition or sub-routine ordering obfuscations in
the code.
3.2.2 Building the Function call graph
Function call graph 𝐺 = (𝑉,𝐸) are composed of vertices V and edges E in which
the vertices denote the functions and the edges denote the function calls between
them [17, 21]. The functions and the corresponding instruction sequences are parsed
to identify the entry point in the program. We have used Breadth First Search
(BFS) [12] technique in the graph construction. We identify the entry point func-
tions in the code. The non-entry point functions are added in the graph based on
their function call relationship with the entry point functions. So, the entry point
functions are in the first level and the non-entry point functions are mapped in the
subsequent levels, thus demonstrating breadth first search. The function that calls
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another function is called the "caller", the function that is being called is called the
"callee" and the relationship is called a "caller-callee" relationship [6].
All the sub-routines in the program are stored in FuncSet. The entry point sub-
routine are identified and saved in EntryFuncSet. The FuncQ is the function queue in
which the EntryFuncSet is initialized and until empty, the function dequeued from
the front of the queue is saved as baseVertex. The baseVertex is then added to
the graph and the enQ flag is set true to avoid duplicate additions to the graph. The
baseVertex is then scanned for its callee set and stored in VerSet. Each function
in VerSet is inserted in FuncSet if it is not present already and assigned as the
headVertex. If not added to the graph it is added with an edge to the baseVertex,
if else it just increments the outDeg of the caller and the inDeg of the callee by one.
If enQ flag of the headVertex is not set true yet, it is set true and enqueued to the
FuncQ. On building the vertices in the graph, the sub-routine name, type, callee list,
indegree, outdegree, EnQ flag status and opcode sequences are stored as shown in
Figure 1. The time complexity of this algorithm is 𝑂(|𝑉 | * |𝐸|) where V is the total
number of vertices and E is the total number of edges [21].
Figure 1: Function attributes stored in vertex for a Zbot file
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Table 1: Building the Function call graph [17]
// Input: Functions in the malware 𝐹 , Output: Function call graph 𝐺𝐹
// Initializations
𝐺𝐹 .𝑉 = 𝜑 and 𝐺𝐹 .𝐸 = 𝜑
EntryFuncSet = 𝜑, FuncSet = 𝜑, FuncQ = 𝜑, VerSet = 𝜑
FuncSet = SplitFuncs(𝐹 )
EntryFuncSet = IdentifyEntryPointFuncs(𝑀)
FuncQ = InitQ(EntryFuncSet)
while(FuncQ is not empty)
baseVertex = Dequeue(FuncQ)
Insert baseVertex in 𝐺𝐹
baseVertex.enQFlag = true
VerSet = getCallee(baseVertex)
for each vertex in VerSet
if(vertex is not in FuncSet)
continue
endif
headVertex = vertex
// Construct an edge between tailVertex and headVertex
if(𝑒 ∈ 𝐺𝐹 .𝐸)
baseVertex.outDeg++
headVertex.inDeg++
else
Insert headVertex in 𝐺𝐹
Insert edge 𝑒 in 𝐺𝐹
endif
if(headVertex.enQFlag == false)
Enqueue headVertex in FuncQ
headVertex.enQFlag = true
endif
next vertex
end while
return 𝐺𝐹
end
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3.3 Function Call Graph Scoring
On building the function call graph, to find the similarity score between the
two malware variants we need to compare the corresponding graphs. The similarity
check between the graphs would imply finding common vertices which represents the
functions or sub-routines. The functions cannot be identified based on specific string
or pattern search as it can be easily defeated using several obfuscation techniques.
The scoring of the similarity is calculated by matching external and internal functions.
The system or library functions have common function names which are of the same
naming convention in all files. So, the external functions are matched based on their
function names. In the local functions, to overcome challenges set by code obfuscation
techniques the instructions are color coded based on its type of action.
3.3.1 Common vertices based on External Functions
External functions generally refer to the system calls or library routine calls. The
system functions are also called the atomic functions. Usually, the external functions
form the leaf node in the graph with an indegree of 1 and outdegree of 0. They can be
mapped using the symbolic names that are same across all executables. For example,
VirtualAllocA, GetWindowsDirectoryA, lstrcatA, CreateFileA are the external
functions that forms the leaf nodes in the Zbot function call graph shown in Fig 2.
Table 2 displays an algorithm that has been used to find common vertices based on
external functions [17].
The external functions are taken from function call graphs of the two malware
variants that are being scored for similarity 𝐺1, 𝐺2 and stored in ExtFuncSet1 and
ExtFuncSet2 respectively. The instructions in the vertices of both sets are anal-
ysed .Each of the i vertices in ExtFuncSet1 are assigned to 𝑈𝑠 and checked with
12
Figure 2: Function call graph with external functions
Table 2: Pseudocode to find common vertices using external functions [17]
// Input: Function call graph of two malware variants 𝐺1 and 𝐺2
// Output: common_vertex(𝐺1, 𝐺2)
ExtFuncSet1 ← External function from 𝐺1
ExtFuncSet2 ← External function from 𝐺2
Copy vertices from 𝐺1 into 𝑈𝑠
Copy vertices from 𝐺2 into 𝑉𝑠
foreach vertex 𝑈𝑠𝑖 𝜖 ExtFuncSet1 do
foreach vertex 𝑉𝑠𝑗 𝜖 ExtFuncSet2 do
if(𝑈𝑠𝑖.name = 𝑉𝑠𝑗.name)
common_vertex(𝐺1, 𝐺2) ← common_vertex(𝐺1, 𝐺2) ∪ (𝑈𝑠𝑖,𝑉𝑠𝑗)
Remove 𝑈𝑠𝑖 from 𝑈𝑠
Remove 𝑉𝑠𝑗 from 𝑉𝑠
end
end
end
all j vertices in ExtFuncSet2 assigned to 𝑉𝑠 and finds if both graphs have any ver-
tices that call the same external function. If such a vertex is found it is stored in
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common_vertex(𝐺1, 𝐺2).
3.3.2 Match local functions based on external functions similarity
If two or more external functions are found matching in a vertex, then it is
considered as a similarity between the local functions that make the call to external
functions. Table 3 is the pseudocode that was used to find matching local functions
pair [17, 21].
Table 3: Pseudocode to find similar local functions based on external functions [17]
// Input: Function call graph 𝐺1 and 𝐺2,𝑈𝑠,𝑉𝑠,common_vertex(𝐺1, 𝐺2)
//Output: common_vertex(𝐺1, 𝐺2)
foreach vertex 𝑈𝑠𝑖 𝜖 𝑈𝑠 do
foreach vertex 𝑉𝑠𝑗 𝜖 𝑉𝑠 do
if(ExtFunc(𝑈𝑠𝑖) ∩ ExtFunc(𝑉𝑠𝑗) ≥ 2) then
common_vertex(𝐺1, 𝐺2) ← common_vertex(𝐺1, 𝐺2) ∪ (𝑈𝑠𝑖,𝑉𝑠𝑗)
Remove 𝑈𝑠𝑖 from 𝑈𝑠
Remove 𝑉𝑠𝑗 from 𝑉𝑠
end
end
end
each of the local functions in the function call graphs 𝐺1, 𝐺2 are matched to
see if they call the same external functions. If the external functions count ex-
ceeds 2, then the function pair is considered as common vertices and added to the
common_vertex(𝐺1, 𝐺2).
3.3.3 Similarity between local functions based on opcode sequence
Finding the similarity between the local functions based on a specific pattern or
signature will not be effective as it can be defeated on using simple dead code insertion
itself. So, we use a unique graph coloring technique. Every vertex is vectorized based
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on the occurrence and frequency of the opcodes which are classified into 15 types as
shown in Table 4.
Table 4: x86 instruction classification [17]
Code Instruction Type Description
𝐶1 Data Data Transfer as mov stmt
𝐶2 Stack Stack Operations
𝐶3 Port In and out
𝐶4 Lea Destination address trans-
mit
𝐶5 Flag Flag transmit
𝐶6 Arithmetic Shift, Rotate etc.
𝐶7 Logic Bitbyte operation
𝐶8 String String operation
𝐶9 Jump Unconditional transfer
𝐶10 Branch Conditional transfer
𝐶11 Loop Loop control
𝐶12 Halt Stop instruction execution
𝐶13 Bit Bit test and bit scan
𝐶14 Processor Processor control
𝐶15 Float Floating point operation
All vertices in the graph are colored base don a 15-bit variable which marks the
occurrence of instructions in each color code. The variable is initialized to 0. On
reading an instruction, the color code that it belongs to based on its operation is
marked 1 in the corresponding bit. Another 15-bit vector stores the frequency of the
corresponding color codes. Table 5 shows a sub-routine from Zbot virus and Table 6
displays the corresponding color codes and frequency vector.
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Table 5: A sub-routine in Zbot virus
sub_401000 proc near
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
mov esp, 0Ch
mov [ebp+var_8], 1E4DCh
mov [ebp+flAllocationType], 3000h
mov [ebp+flProtect], 40h
mov eax, [ebp+flProtect]
push eax
mov ecx, [ebp+flAllocationType]
push ecx
mov edx, [ebp+dwSize]
push edx
push 0
push 0FFFFFFFFh
call VirtualAllocA
mov esp, ebp
pop ebp
retn
sub_401000 endp
Table 6: Occurrence and Frequency color coded vector of the above Zbot sub-routine
Opcode’s C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15
Occurrence 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Frequency 9 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
The frequency vector of the two graphs are stored as 𝑋 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, ..., 𝑥15) and
𝑌 = (𝑦1, 𝑦2, ..., 𝑦15) and the cosine similarity of them are computed as shown in
formula (1) [17]:
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sim(𝑋, 𝑌 ) =
∑︀15
𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖.𝑦𝑖√︁∑︀15
𝑖=1 𝑥
2
𝑖 .
√︁∑︀15
𝑖=1 𝑦
2
𝑖
(1)
The calculated cosine similarity is checked for whether it is greater than or equal
to a threshold value of 𝛼 and we also compare the color codes of the two vertices
and if found the same the local functions are found as a common vertex match.
Table 7 shows a pseudocode that is used to compute the color similarity between the
vertices [17, 21].
Table 7: Pseudocode to find color similarity between two functions [17]
// Input: Functions 𝑓1 and 𝑓2
// Output: color similarity between 𝑓1 and 𝑓2
colorCode1 ← getColorSequence from 𝑓1
colorCode2 ← getColorSequence from 𝑓2
if(color1=color2)
freqVector1 ← getVector from 𝑓1
freqVector2 ← getVector from 𝑓2
color_sim ← compute cosine similarity between vector1 and vector2
end
return color_sim
In the pseudocode, the computation of color similarity between two functions
is described. Similarly, all the functions in the malware variants are computed.The
functions 𝑓1 and 𝑓2 are provided as input to calculate the cosine similarity between
the functions. The functions are first assigned a color based on the occurrence of
the instructions which are stored as colorCode1 and colorCode2 from 𝑓1 and 𝑓2.
If the color code of the two functions are found similar, then the frequency of the
corresponding instructions are stored in vectors freqVector1 and freqVector2. The
cosine similarity between the frequency vectors are computed using the formula(1)
mentioned above. Aiming for perfection, two more criteria as the length of the opcode
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sequences which refers to the number of bytes in the function and the total degree of
the function which is calculated by adding the indegree (total number of times the
function is called) and the outdegree (total number of times the function is called by
other functions) are used for scoring. If the cosine similarity of the two frequency
vectors is greater than or equal to 𝛼 and the length similarity (len_sim) is greater
than or equal to 𝛽 and degree similarity(degree_sim) is greater than or equal to 𝛾.
The length similarity is computed based on the formula (2) as shown below. The
length(𝑓1) is the number of bytes in function 𝑓1 and length(𝑓2) is the number of
bytes in function 𝑓2. The smaller value of the two is divided by the other to obtain
a value between 0 and 1.
length_sim(𝑓1, 𝑓2) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
length(𝑓1)
length(𝑓2)
if length(𝑓1) ≤ length(𝑓2)
length(𝑓2)
length(𝑓1)
otherwise.
(2)
The degree similarity is computed using the formula (3) in which the degree(𝑓1)
is the total degree of the function 𝑓1 and degree(𝑓2) is the total degree of the function
𝑓2. The degree_sim is assigned 1 if the degrees of the two functions are equal, else
the unsigned reciprocal of their differences is used.
degree_sim(𝑓1, 𝑓2) =
{︃
1 if deg(𝑓1) = deg(𝑓2)
1
|deg(𝑓1)− deg(𝑓2)| otherwise.
(3)
The threshold values of 𝛼, 𝛽 and 𝛾 are set as 0.98, 0.83 and 0.5 respectively
based on previous experiments [17, 21]. Table 8 details the pseudocode to find similar
function pair using the color similarity [6].
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Table 8: Pseudocode to find similar local functions using color similarity [17]
// Input: Function call graph 𝐺1 and 𝐺2,𝑈𝑠,𝑉𝑠,common_vertex(𝐺1, 𝐺2)
//Output: common_vertex(𝐺1, 𝐺2)
foreach vertex 𝑈𝑠𝑖 𝜖 𝑈𝑠 do
foreach vertex 𝑉𝑠𝑗 𝜖 𝑉𝑠 do
if(color_sim(𝑈𝑠𝑖,𝑉𝑠𝑗) ≥ 𝛼 ∩
length_sim(𝑈𝑠𝑖,𝑉𝑠𝑗) ≥ 𝛽 ∩
degree_sim(𝑈𝑠𝑖,𝑉𝑠𝑗) ≥ 𝛾) then
common_vertex(𝐺1, 𝐺2) ← common_vertex(𝐺1, 𝐺2) ∪ (𝑈𝑠𝑖,𝑉𝑠𝑗)
Remove 𝑈𝑠𝑖 from 𝑈𝑠
Remove 𝑉𝑠𝑗 from 𝑉𝑠
end
end
end
3.3.4 Similarity between local functions based on matched neighbors
Now that we have found common vertices between the two graphs based on
the internal and external functions, we can further analyze based on the results.
There is a high probability that two vertices are similar if their neighbors match in
graph theory. So, if the predecessor or successor of a specific vertex is a common
vertex then the vertex may also be a common vertex. In Figure 3 the vertices 𝑉1
and 𝑉2 are already identified as common vertices, then its neighbors A, B and C,
D respectively are rechecked using a color_relaxed_sim to find whether they are
similar. The color_relaxed_sim is computed same as the Table 7 except that the
functions’ color codes need not match and the cosine similarity can be computed
from the frequency vectors directly. Table 9 presents the pseudocode used to find
similar functions based on matched successors and the same pseudocode applies for
predecessors too by replacing successor(u) and successor(v) by predecessor(u) and
predecessor(v) respectively. [21].
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Figure 3: Successors of common vertices 𝑉1 and 𝑉2 are candidate vertices
Table 9: Pseudocode to find similar local functions based on matched successor [17]
// Input: Function call graph 𝐺1 and 𝐺2,𝑈𝑠,𝑉𝑠,common_vertex(𝐺1, 𝐺2)
//Output: common_vertex(𝐺1, 𝐺2)
vertexQ ← InitvertexQ(common_vertex(𝐺1, 𝐺2))
while (vertexQ is not empty)
(u,v) ← vertexQ.dequeue()
foreach vertex 𝑈𝑠𝑖 𝜖 successor(u) ∩ 𝑈𝑠 do
foreach vertex 𝑉𝑠𝑗 𝜖 successor(v) ∩ 𝑉𝑠 do
if(color_relaxed_sim(𝑈𝑠𝑖,𝑉𝑠𝑗) ≥ 𝛿) then
common_vertex(𝐺1, 𝐺2) ← common_vertex(𝐺1, 𝐺2) ∪ (𝑈𝑠𝑖,𝑉𝑠𝑗)
Remove 𝑈𝑠𝑖 from 𝑈𝑠
Remove 𝑉𝑠𝑗 from 𝑉𝑠
vertexQ.enqueue(𝑈𝑠𝑖,𝑉𝑠𝑗)
end
end
end
end
return common_vertex(𝐺1, 𝐺2)
The vertexQ is initialized with the vertices in the common_vertex(𝐺1, 𝐺2). Each
vertex in the queue are dequeued one by one and the successor or predecessor of the
corresponding vertices. If the color_relaxed_sim of the successor or predecessor
vertices are found to satisfy or exceed the threshold value set for 𝛿 then the vertices
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are considered similar.
3.3.5 Similarity between function call graph
To compute the consolidated score of similarity between the function call graphs,
the common edges are computed. The edge is the "caller-callee" relationship that
was mentioned before. If common vertices W and X share an edge in graph 𝐺1 and
common vertices Y and Z share an edge in graph 𝐺2 then it is called a common edge.
The overall similarity between the two malware function call graphs are computed
using Formula (4) [17, 6]:
sim(𝐺1, 𝐺2) =
2|common_edge(𝐺1, 𝐺2)|
|𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒(𝐺1)|+ |𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒(𝐺2)| * 100 (4)
in which |common_edge(𝐺1, 𝐺2)| denotes all the common edges between the two
function call graphs 𝐺1 and 𝐺2 and |𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒(𝐺1)| + |𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒(𝐺2)| represents the total
number of edges in graph 𝐺1 and 𝐺2. Scoring the same file should give a value of 1
and scoring a malware variant should give a value between 0 and 1 based on the level
of obfuscation in which the less obfuscated would be closer to 1.
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CHAPTER 4
Types of obfuscation techniques
The metamorphic virus detection has been a tough task because the virus is
capable of mutating its body to an extent that no two versions of the same malware
can be assigned a common signature for detection and hence are undetectable by
signature based detection [14]. This level of obfuscation in the code is achieved
by one or a combination of multiple code obfuscation techniques which are detailed
below:
4.1 Instruction substitution
The instruction substitution is a simple obfuscation technique in which the com-
mon instructions that have similar usage are replaced instead of the other. [15] By
substituting the instruction with a similar one, the functionality of the code remains
intact and the code also does not look the same as before. For example, the instruc-
tions JB (Jump if Below), JC (Jump if Carry), JNAE (Jump if Not above or Equal)
all perform the same action of setting CF (Carry Flag) as 1. Using these instructions
interchangeably will not affect the function of the code.
Considering this technique to impede the function call graph similarity it may
not be effective, as in our detection technique, the opcodes are color coded based
on functionality and used for computing the score. So, even if we substitute the
instructions they will fall under the same group and will be no different from the
previous code.
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4.2 Register swap
Register swap is another simple technique in which the registers are swapped by
not hindering the intended action of the part of the code; at the same time it forms
another generation of the malware as it can evade signature based detection having
altered registers all through the code. For example, the register EAX, EBX, EDX are
swapped with EBX, EDX, EAX respectively. This small change is enough to fool the
signature based detection. But if the detection method has wildcard search in place
of registers it can be easily identified. [28]
Applying this technique to weaken our detection method will not fetch results as
we only consider the opcodes for finding similarity and the registers are not considered
for evaluation.
4.3 Subroutine ordering
In subroutine ordering, the order of the subroutines are altered in a random
manner. [15, 14] Such an action will not change the effect of the code as the program
with subroutines are not sequential, they call for the start address of the subroutine
and thus does not hinder the functionality. For example, if a malware is composed of
8 subroutines, there are 8! ways, that is 40320 ways to mutate the malware [28].
In function call graph method, it may not be effective as we compute a graph
from subroutines based on their calls and not by position.
4.4 Code transposition
Similar to the subroutine ordering, the code within the subroutine are re-
ordered [15] if they do not demand computation in sequence. By shuffling the in-
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structions, the signature detection can be defeated.
This technique may not be effective in our detection as the instruction sequence
is not considered and only the list of opcodes are used to compute the score.
4.5 Code integration
The code integration is a more sophisticated means of obfuscating the code in
which the virus on spreading the infection, attaches itself to the executable of the
host. For example, Zmist virus [6] decompiles PE (Portable Executable) of the host
file and smartly inserts the malware code by part, integrates itself and repackages the
executable making it extremely hard to detect.
4.6 Dead code insertion
Dead code insertion is the most commonly used detection technique. Dead code
is the piece of code that just performs meaningless actions which does not produce
any results. When dead code is appended to any program it will not affect the code.
For example, the No Operation (NOP) on being inserted will not perform any action
but may tamper the signature of the malware [14, 13]. The dead code can be inserted
in two ways:
1. Block morphing: In this type of morphing, a block of the dead code is inserted
in the malware [15]. This may hinder the signature based detection and prove
effective based on the malware. If the block added is not part of the unique
part of malware extracted to make signature then it may not prove effective.
2. Random morphing: In random morphing, single or few of lines of the dead
code are inserted at random all through the malware code. Sometimes, when
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the percentage of benign code added to malware code increases there may be
a chance all the mutated codes are quite similar. The dead code used to be
inserted has to be varied in each generation to fetch better results.
Dead code insertion technique used to defeat the function call graph score may
result in any of the three scenarios:
1. On using block morphing, if the benign dead code is added as a block in between
two subroutines or at start or end of program, the score will not be affected as
the detection method only takes the subroutines and the instructions in it into
consideration.
2. On using block morphing, if block of dead code is added within a subroutine,
it will only affect one sub-routine and hence will not make a big difference
3. On using random morphing, if significant number of lines of dead code are
inserted in all subroutines, it may be deter or boost the scores depending on
whether the code is inserted to a an already obfuscated dead coded subrou-
tine (as we are dealing with metamorphic malware) or a matching sub-routine
respectively.
The same random morphing technique when applied using external function calls
as dead code is very effective in defeating the function call graph based detection.
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CHAPTER 5
Experiments
In this chapter, we will be discussing on the results obtained on scoring metamor-
phic malware files using function call graph analysis and few experiments on defeating
the score by using code morphing.
5.1 Chosen Dataset
We have used NGVCK, Zbot, ZeroAccess and Harebot files to be scored. The
New Generation Virus Generation Kit (NGVCK) is a metamorphic worm that has
been created to defeat the Hidden Markov Model (HMM) detection technique [6] using
obfuscation techniques as dead code insertion and instruction substitution. Zbot [23]
and ZeroAccess [24] are trojans that infects the host system and uses stealth tech-
niques to collect sensitive data. Harebot [8] is a backdoor which usually attacks the
Operating system and consumes the system resources bringing down the system’s
productivity. For this research, we have used 30 cygwin files for the benign dataset.
Table 10 lists the number of files used in each malware family.
Table 10: Malware files
Malware family Number of files
Zbot 22
NGVCK 38
Zeroaccess 38
Harebot 52
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5.2 Receiving Operating Characteristics
Receiving Operating Characteristics(ROC) is a graphical plot that is used to
measure the accuracy of detection. The ROC curve is drawn using the true positive
rate(TPR) and false positive rate(FPR) by assessing several other criteria. The area
under the curve (AUC) is the measured value from the plot that is used for comparing
the performance from experiments. The best case of obtaining an AUC of 1.0 implies
that it was a perfect classification with no false positives or false negatives. The value
of the ROC may range between 0.5 and 1. Figure 4 shows the an ROC curve with an
AUC value of 1.0.
Figure 4: An ROC curve with AUC = 1.0 [25]
5.3 Scoring of the files
We have implemented the function call graph detection method using Java as
discussed in Chapter 3. Initially, the executable in assembly language format is pre-
processed to obtain the sub-routines of the specific file. After the first set of trial
experiments in NGVCK family as shown in Fig 5, we had to adjust the threshold
values of 𝛼, 𝛽 and 𝛾 as 0.80, 0.5 and 0.5 respectively as it produced more accurate
results for the chosen dataset.
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Figure 5: NGVCK ROC curve with change in threshold values
5.3.1 NGVCK files
We scored the NGVCK files using our detection method and was able to classify
the benign files and malware variants. On scoring the malware files with benign files,
most of the scores were 0.0 denoting no similarity between the files and the maximum
score was 0.044 whereas scoring the malware variants within themselves most of the
scores were above 0.2.
Figure 6 shows the scatter plot that clearly classifies the files and Figure 7 shows
an ROC curve based on the scores obtained which gives an AUC of 0.99 which is
good as it is very close to 1.0.
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Figure 6: NGVCK Scatterplot
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Figure 7: NGVCK ROC Curve
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5.3.2 Zbot files
The Zbot files were also scored using the function call graph implementation
and successfully classified the benign and malware files. The malware variants when
scoring within themselves gave high values and on scoring with benign files they
showed no similarity by scoring 0.0 for most files.
Figure 8 displays the differentiation between benign and malware files and Fig-
ure 9 shows the ROC curve which are plotted using the scores and it provides an
AUC of 0.96.
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Figure 8: Zbot Scatterplot
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Figure 9: Zbot ROC Curve
31
5.3.3 ZeroAccess files
On scoring the ZeroAccess files using our detection method, we found that it
failed to get classified as clear as the previous families. The benign files when scored
with malware files had the maximum score of 0.03 and on scoring with its malware
variants scores an average of 0.07.
Figure 10 shows the scatter plot of the ZeroAccess files in which the benign and
malware files seem to score similar except for a few outliers and Figure 11 shows an
ROC curve of the ZeroAccess files with an AUC of 0.77.
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Figure 10: ZeroAccess Scatterplot
5.3.4 Harebot files
On scoring the Harebot files, the results were relatively worse than the ZeroAccess
family. Most of the benign files and malware files score the same and there is no
distinct classification between the two files.
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Figure 11: ZeroAccess ROC Curve
Figure 12 shows the scatter plot in which it is evident that the benign and
malware files are not distinctly clear and Figure 13 shows an the ROC plotted with
the results fetching an AUC of 0.60.
5.3.5 Analysis of scores
In the four families, NGVCK and Zbot have scored well by using function call
graph analysis. But, function call graph detection failed to classify the malwares in
ZeroAccess and Harebot families. On having a closer look at the files, it was evident
that in cases when two files which had big difference in their file sizes did not score
well. In Chapter 3, when computing similarity between the graphs using Formula (4)
as the common edges are not normalized with respect to the total number of edges in
each graph they fail to score well. To clarify the assumption we scored the ZeroAccess
and Harebot files in sets classified based on file size.
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Figure 12: Harebot Scatterplot
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Figure 13: Harebot ROC Curve
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5.4 Scoring the files in sets
The files are partitioned in sets based on file sizes and scored using the function
call graph analysis.
5.4.1 ZeroAccess family
On scoring the 120 ZeroAccess files as sets, the ZeroAccess family scored well. In
fact, it achieved a perfect AUC of 1.0 in one of the sets. Table 11 shows the details
of the files in the sets and the corresponding AUC values. Figure 14 shows the ROC
curves of the sets in the ZeroAccess family.
Table 11: Zero Access files set
No. of files Filesize Range AUC Values
Set 1 20 25 - 30 KB 0.91
Set 2 40 31 - 40 KB 0.74
Set 3 40 110 - 112 KB 0.96
Set 4 20 114 - 128 KB 1.0
5.4.2 Harebot family
On scoring 40 Harebot files in two sets, though there is a substantial increase in
the AUC values the classification is not discrete. On further analysis on the files, we
found that the reason for low scores in Harebot was because it had only a couple of
external functions in each program. Since atleast two external functions from same
sub-routine has to match to be considered common vertex, Harebot may not have
any similarity in the external functions attribute. Table 12 shows the details of the
files in the sets and the corresponding AUC values. Figure 15 shows the ROC curves
of the sets in the ZeroAccess family.
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Figure 14: ZeroAccess ROC curve of the sets
Table 12: Harebot file sets
No. of files Filesize Range AUC Values
Set 1 20 7 - 11 KB 0.74
Set 2 20 13 - 31 KB 0.62
5.5 Defeating the score
In this section, we have defeated the function call graph scoring method. The
code obfuscation used to morph the malware is dead code insertion. As discussed
in Chapter 4, block morphing will fail to defeat the method as it only affects one
sub-routine. We have used external functions as dead code and randomly inserted it
as chunks of code in all subroutines.
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Figure 15: Harebot ROC curve of the sets
5.5.1 NGVCK family
Starting from 15% random morphing, we can see the effect in the AUC values.
Figure 16 shows the ROC curves starting from 5% to 40% in which there is a significant
change from 10% to 15%S˙ince there is a hill climb behavior in 35% we plotted the
morphed values from 10% to 200% in which the score gradually increases. This
indicates that a threshold of 15% to 35% should be set for morphing to defeat the
NGVCK score. Figure 17 clearly visualizes the necessity to set a threshold value for
morphing.
5.5.2 Zbot family
Similar to the NGVCK family, Zbot also has low AUC values starting from 15%
and the pattern continues until 35% after which a gradual increase is to be noted. The
difference in the scores from 10% to 15% is graphically depicted using ROC curves in
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Figure 16: NGVCK Morphed ROC Curve
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Figure 18.
5.5.3 Consolidated results
The consolidated results from the external function dead code random morphing
is displayed in Table 13. Both NGVCK and Zbot files starting 15% show promising
results. Notably, as the morphing % increases the malware variants are found similar
within themselves. Hence, a threshold must be set on the level of morphing to defeat
the method consistently.
5.6 Scoring files on a larger number of files
To find whether the results are consistent, the function call graph scoring is
experimented on more no. of files. Table 14 shows the malware families and the
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Figure 17: NGVCK Morphed 10% - 200%
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Table 13: AUC curve results for morphed NGVCK and Zbot files
AUC
Morphing NGVCK Zbot
0% 0.99 0.96
5% 0.99 0.96
10% 0.98 0.93
15% 0.75 0.84
20% 0.64 0.87
25% 0.65 0.84
30% 0.62 0.83
35% 0.65 0.84
40% 0.67 0.83
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Figure 18: Zbot Morphed ROC Curve
number of files used for this experiment.
Table 14: Number of files used in each family
Malware family Number of files
Zbot 100
NGVCK 100
Zeroaccess 100
5.6.1 NGVCK family
On scoring the larger dataset, the AUC values are lower which maybe because
of a few outliers in the total files used. Figure 19 shows an AUC of 0.94 which is still
a good score and classifies most malwares from the files.
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Figure 19: NGVCK ROC Curve (100 files)
5.6.2 Zbot family
The Zbot family seem to have a setback in the AUC value. As shown in Figure 20
has an AUC of 0.8 which fails to classify the malware effectively. At a closer look on
the files used, similar to ZeroAccess it has a larger difference in the file sizes used.
By dividing it into sets based on filesize, we can have a clearer picture of the overall
score for Zbot family. Table 15 shows the details about each set and Figure 21 shows
the AUC values of the sets.
Table 15: Zbot sets
No. of files Filesize Range AUC Values
Set 1 30 4 KB 0.84
Set 2 60 5 KB 0.72
Set 3 20 6 - 8 KB 0.96
Set 4 40 9 - 13 KB 0.8
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Figure 20: Zbot ROC Curve (100 files)
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Figure 21: Zbot ROC curve in sets
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5.6.3 ZeroAccess family
The score of the ZeroAccess family is consistent with the previous experiment.
Figure 22 shows the AUC value of 0.75 in the Zero Access ROC curve.
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Figure 22: ZeroAccess ROC Curve (100 files)
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion and Future Work
The main goal of our project was to study the function call graph analysis [6, 17,
21], implement and score it on metamorphic malware families and defeat the score to
understand how the detection method can be made more effective and efficient. The
function call graph analysis scores the metamorphic malware based on similar external
functions, local functions that have similar external functions, cosine similarity based
on frequency of opcodes which are classified and color coded based on the purpose of
the instructions and matching neighbors of similar local functions. Additionally, the
length of the functions and degree similarity are also added as thresholds to make the
detection effective. From all the above comparisons, the common vertices between
the function call graphs of the two malware variant is found. Using these common
vertices, the total number of common edges between the vertices of the graphs are
found and used to score the malwares.
We scored four malware families: NGVCK, Zbot, ZeroAccess and Harebot to
analyze how the detection technique is effective in these families. The NGVCK and
Zbot detected the malware and classified them by scoring higher than the benign
files. But the ZeroAccess and Harebot families were not very successful in detecting
the malwares. We also tried to defeat the NGVCK and Zbot scores using random
block morphing and achieved considerable success in it.
For future work, these experiments can be implemented in comparison of different
threshold parameters 𝛼, 𝛽 and 𝛾, as some malware families perform well at higher
thresholds and some at lower thresholds. The annotated call graph similarity [1],
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external functions similarity [29], opcode graph similarity [20] and the function call
graph similarity [17] can be incorporated to build a hybrid robust detection technique
that can overcome all the limitations of the detection methods. The common vertices
by external functions happen to be the most contributing factor in the score which
can be exploited by random morphing of benign external function calls. The external
function based match has to be normalized based on total number of external function
calls. The function call graph detection technique is more effective in files with
same number of sub-routines. On considering two malware variants, in which one
is obfuscated extensively by adding dead code the function call graph method fails
to identify one file as the subset of other which implies it is similar. To rectify this
flaw, the common edges need to be normalized not just by the total number of edges
in both graphs but by total number of edges in each graph.
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